UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-18-2014

State v. Edwards Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42202

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Edwards Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42202" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5168.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5168

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
~

JODIE MARIE EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant.
___________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 42202
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2013-3324

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNER

HONORABLE BARBARA A. BUCHANAN
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8210
3050 N. Lake Harbor.Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720m0010
(208) 334-4534

,.
I

I t%JV
\

"'

'""'

: ,'
''

,I

10 LU/-1

••••••••·''_.,.-,;,

,.t,,,,,,,,• \

l'.

'1•

,,,,

,\'-)i:\i_ ,,.,'11,,;:>':t:'·"_,,_,,_ ,..,~,-,,,
·,.
,.,.,.,,.,,,.,""·"""""

L,,.,,,.,...•....•• .................... ,.....

....••..•., .... ~•···••••·•

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF AUTHORITI

............................................................................................ ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................... 1
Nature of the

.................................................................................. 1

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSU

PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................................. 3

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................4
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To
Suppress Evidence Because Her
Was In Compliance With
I.C. § 49-949 ............................................................................................................ 4
A. Introduction ...........................................................................................................4
B. Standard Of Review .......................................................................................... .
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To
Suppress Evidence Because Her Truck Was In Compliance With
I.C. § 49-949 ......................................................................................................... 5
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 8
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................................ 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) ................................................................ 5
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65 (2003) 5
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ......................................................... 2
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927) ..................................................................... 5
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) .................................................................. 5
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992) ............................................................... 5
State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961 (Ct. App. 2004) .............................................. 6
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482 (2009) ...................................................... .4, 5
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ................................................. 6

Constitutional Provisions
Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution .................................................. .4, 5
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ...................................... .4, 5

Statutes
I.C. § 49-121(10)(c) ...............................................................................................6
I.C. § 49-949 ............................................................................................... passim

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jodie Edwards timely appealed from the
On appeal, Mr. Edwards

judgment of conviction.

that the district

it denied her motion

to suppress the State's evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A police officer, Officer Hughes, noticed a truck with a bed that was
approximately twenty inches of the ground that did not have any mud flaps. (R., pp.27,
109-110.) Officer Hughes suspected that the driver of

truck, Ms. Edwards, was in

violation of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), which requires all trucks to have fenders or covers which
"in full width from a point above and forward of the center of the tires over and to
the rear of the wheels to a point that is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface
of the highway when the vehicle is empty."

(R., pp.27, 109-110.)

suspicion, Officer Hughes pulled Ms. Edwards over.

Based on that

(R., pp.27, 109-110.)

While

checking the status Ms. Edwards' driver's license, Officer Hughes discovered that she
had

an

outstand

warrant

and

arrested

her.

(R.,

pp.27,

109-110.)

While

conducting an inventory search of Ms. Edwards' vehicle, Officer Hughes discovered
methamphetamine. (R., pp.27-28, 109-110.)
Ms. Edwards was charged, by information, with possession of a controlled
substance.

(R., pp.78-79.) Ms. Edwards filed a motion to suppress evidence and a

memorandum in support, wherein she argued that I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) exempted her
truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because it had a factory built
bumper. (R., pp.99-108.) Ms. Edwards also argued that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) exempted

1

her truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her existing fenders and
bumper were capable, at ail times, of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, and other
substances. (R., pp.102-106.) Instead of holding a hearing on the motion, the parties
stipulated to the facts. (R., pp.97-98.)
The district court ultimately disagreed with Ms. Edwards, ruling that the
exemption contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) was not applicable to Ms. Edwards' truck
because the statute contained the phrase
(R., pp.111-114.)

"every motor vehicle other than trucks."

The district court also ruled that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) is not an

exemption to I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), and that the statute actually requires that all fenders or
covers, which comply with I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), must also be capable of arresting and
deflecting dirt, mud, water, and other substances. (R., pp.114-115.)
Ms. Edwards entered a conditional Alford 1 plea, preserving her ability to
challenge the denial of her suppression motion on appeal.

(R., pp.120-122; Tr., p.4,

L.21 - p.5, L.10.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years,
with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Edwards on
probation. (R., pp.175-178.) Ms. Edwards timely appealed. (R., pp.206-208.)

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Edwards' motion to suppress evidence
because her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949?

3

Ttle District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To Suppress Evidence
Because Her Truck Was In Compliance With I.C. § 49-949

Ms.

when it denied her motion

claims that the district

suppress evidence because her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated
when she was detained without reasonable suspicion.

Specifically, Ms. Edwards

argues that her truck was exempted from the "mud flap" requirement contained in
I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her truck had a factory built bumper.
argues that her truck was exempted from

Additionally,

"mud flap" requirement contained in

I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her truck's bumper

fenders were capable of arresting

and deflecting dirt, mud, water, and other substances.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to

a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the trial
court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Willoughby,
147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). Second, appellate courts review de nova the trial court's
application of constitutional and statutory principles to the facts as found.

Id. at 485-

486; see also City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65,
69 (2003).

4

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To Suppress
Evidence Because Her Truck Was In Compliance With LC.§ 49-949
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people

the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Willoughby, 14 7 Idaho at
486. Similar privacy rights are also protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.

State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981

(1992).
Even brief detentions of individuals must comport with State and Federal
requirements of reasonableness.

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). This

means that the detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place. Id.
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable,
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed,
or is about to commit, a crime. Id. at 811. However, the officer must be able to point to
specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires more than a
mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id.
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). The question of whether an
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention.

Id.
When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and/or Article I Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in
question was reasonable. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. If the government fails to meet
this burden, the remedy is suppression of the State's evidence.
5

Id. Additionally, "If

evidence is not seized pursuant to a mcognized exception to the warrant requirement,
the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the 'fruit of
the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
Ms. Edwards argues that Officer Hughes did not have reasonable suspicion to
detain her because her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949.

The applicable

portions of that statute provide:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or move or any owner to
permit to be operated or moved, any motor vehicle, truck, bus, semitrailer
or trailer, upon any highway without having the vehicle equipped with
fenders or covers which may include flaps or splash aprons, over and to
the rear of wheels, as follows:
(a) On the rear wheels of every truck equipped with a body,
bus, trailer or semitrailer the fenders or covers shall extend
in full width from a point above and forward of the center of
the tires over and to the rear of the wheels to a point that is
not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the
highway when the vehicle is empty
1.C. § 49-949.
Ms. Edwards argues that even though her truck 2 did not have a cover which
extended to a point which was not more than ten inches from the surface of the
highway, she argues that her truck was still in compliance with I.C. 49-949, because her
truck fell within an exemption to the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), which is
contained in I.C. 49-949(1 )(c). That provision follows:
(c) Behind all wheels of every motor vehicle other than trucks, buses,
semitrailers, or trailers, the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from
a point above and forward of the center of the tire over and to the rear of
2

Idaho Code Section 49-121 (1 0)(c) defines pickup truck as "Every motor vehicle eight
thousand (8,000) pounds gross weight or less which is designed, used or maintained
primarily for the transportation of property." Ms. Edwards stipulated that she was driving
a pickup truck, as defined by I.C. § 49-121(10)(c). (R., p.98.)

6

the wheel to a point that is not more than twenty (20) inches above the
surface of the highway, unless the bumper is a factory built bumper
fastened directly to the frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation
requirements
I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) (emphasis added). The district court disagreed with Ms. Edwards
and ruled that I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c), is not applicable to her truck, because the statute
contains the phrase "other than trucks." (R., pp.111-114.) Mindful of the fact that the
plain language of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) does not apply to trucks, Ms. Edwards nonetheless
asserts that her factory built bumper exempts her truck from the requirements of
1.C. § 49-949(1)(a). (R., pp.99-108.)
Ms. Edwards also argues that her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949,
because her truck was exempted from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), due to a
provision contained in I.C. § 49-949(2)(b). The applicable portions of I.C. § 49-949(2)
follow:
(2) Fenders or covers, as used in subsection (1) of this section, shall be
deemed to be of sufficient size and construction as to comply with those
requirements if constructed as follows:

(b) The fender or cover is constructed as to be capable at all
times of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other
substance as may be picked up and carried by wheels
I.C. § 49-949(2).

Ms. Edwards argues that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b), exempts all vehicles

from the requirements contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 ), if the vehicle's fender or cover is
capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances. (R., pp.99108.) The district court disagreed with Ms. Edwards and ruled that I.C. § 49-949(2)(a),
adds a general requirement, in addition to those contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 ), to all
fenders and covers that they are capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or
other substances.

(R., pp.114-115.)

Regardless of whether I.C. § 49-949(2)(b)
7

exempts vehicles from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1) or whether I.C. § 49·949(2)(b) adds requirements to those contained I.C. § 49-949(1 ), Ms. Edwards did not
submit any evidence to support her theory that her vehicle's fenders and bumper were
capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances. (R., pp.9798.) Mindful of this evidentiary shortcoming, Ms. Edwards still argues that I.C. § 49949(2)(b) exempts her truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her
truck was capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances.
Ms. Edwards maintains that she was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949, and that
Officer Hughes illegally detained her.

Due to the illegality of her initial detention she

argues that all evidence which was discovered as a result of that detention must be
suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Edwards respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order denying her motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2014.
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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